

BEFORE THE WASHINGTON STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:

JOSHUA A. HOOD
9000 MT HOOD AVE
VANCOUVER, WA 98664-2735

MAST PERMIT HOLDER

PERMIT NO. 120 441 099
AVN NO. 1J0351D

LCB NO. 23,810
OAH NO. 2011-LCB-0011

FINAL ORDER OF THE BOARD

The above captioned matter coming on regularly before the Board, and it appearing that:

1. The Liquor Control Board issued a complaint dated February 16, 2011, alleging that on December 17, 2010 the above-named Permit Holder gave, sold and/or supplied liquor to a person under the age of twenty-one (21), contrary to RCW 66.44.270 and WAC 314-11-020(1).
2. The Permit Holder made a timely request for a hearing.
3. An administrative hearing was held on July 28, 2011 before Administrative Law Judge Katherine A. Lewis with the Office of Administrative Hearings in Vancouver, Washington.
4. At the hearing, the Education and Enforcement Division of the Board was represented by Assistant Attorney General Brian Considine. Permit holder Joshua Hood appeared and was represented by Tresa G. Cavanaugh, Attorney at Law.
5. On September 23, 2011, Administrative Law Judge Katherine A. Lewis entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Initial Order in this matter, which affirmed the Complaint.
6. The parties filed no petitions for review.

7. The entire record in this proceeding was presented to the Board for final decision, and the Board having fully considered said record and being fully advised in the premises;


NOW THEREFORE; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that that the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Initial Order heretofore made and entered in this matter be, and the same hereby are, AFFIRMED and adopted as the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order of the Board,

Having affirmed the Initial Order, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the standard penalty of five (5) days suspension, or a monetary penalty of two hundred dollars (\$200) in lieu of suspension, shall apply to Permit Holder Joshua A. Hood, MAST No. 120 441 099.

It is noted that a payment of \$200.00 was received from Joshua A. Hood on October 13, 2011 and no additional penalty is due regarding this matter.

DATED at Olympia, Washington this 20th day of December, 2011.

WASHINGTON STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD







Reconsideration. Pursuant to RCW 34.05.470, you have ten (10) days from the mailing of this Order to file a petition for reconsideration stating the specific grounds on which relief is requested. A petition for reconsideration, together with any argument in support thereof, should be filed by mailing or delivering it directly to the Washington State Liquor Control Board, Attn: Kevin McCarroll, 3000 Pacific Avenue Southeast, PO Box 43076, Olympia, WA 98504-3076,

with a copy to all other parties of record and their representatives. Filing means actual receipt of the document at the Board's office. RCW 34.05.010(6). A copy shall also be sent to Mary M. Tennyson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, 1125 Washington St. SE, P.O. Box 40110, Olympia, WA 98504-0110. A timely petition for reconsideration is deemed to be denied if, within twenty (20) days from the date the petition is filed, the agency does not (a) dispose of the petition or (b) serve the parties with a written notice specifying the date by which it will act on the petition. An order denying reconsideration is not subject to judicial review. RCW 34.05.470(5). The filing of a petition for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for filing a petition for judicial review.

Stay of Effectiveness. The filing of a petition for reconsideration does not stay the effectiveness of this Order. The Board has determined not to consider a petition to stay the effectiveness of this Order. Any such request should be made in connection with a petition for judicial review under chapter 34.05 RCW and RCW 34.05.550.

Judicial Review. Proceedings for judicial review may be instituted by filing a petition in superior court according to the procedures specified in chapter 34.05 RCW, Part V, Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement. The petition for judicial review of this Order shall be filed with the appropriate court and served on the Board, the Office of the Attorney General, and all parties within thirty days after service of the final order, as provided in RCW 34.05.542.

Service. This Order was served on you the day it was deposited in the United States mail. RCW 34.05.010(19).

STATE OF WASHINGTON
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
FOR THE LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD

MAILED
SEP 23 2011
VANCOUVER OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

In the Matter of:

Joshua A. Hood,

Permit Holder

Permit No. 120 441 099

OAH No.: 2011-LCB-0011

LCB No.: 23, 810

**FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND INITIAL ORDER**

TO: Joshua A. Hood, Permit Holder
Tresa G. Cavanaugh, Attorney for Permit Holder
Brian Considine, Assistant Attorney General

RECEIVED

OCT 03 2011

PREHEARING MOTIONS

Liquor Control Board
Board Administration

I. Licensee's Motion to Suppress and Motion to Dismiss

Prior to the hearing, the Permit Holder argued a Motion to Suppress the Board's evidence and a Motion to Dismiss the Board's case. The Permit Holder argued:

1. The Board is required to promulgate a rule allowing its officers to engage in compliance checks. No such rule has been promulgated. Therefore, the check was unlawful and the case should be dismissed.
2. The use of a minor investigative aides in the compliance check is also not provided for by rule and therefore the evidence obtained should be suppressed and the case should be dismissed.
3. The minor investigative aide committed the crime of trespass by entering the establishment a second time during the compliance check. The evidence obtained should therefore be suppressed and the case dismissed.
4. The compliance check amounted to entrapment by the Board's agents and the case should be dismissed.

DISCUSSION

1. *Can the Liquor Control Board engage in controlled buys?*

The permit holder argues that without a rule promulgated by the agency, the officers do not have the authority to engage in compliance checks (controlled buys).

The permit holder at partly bases this argument on the fact that there is a rule promulgated which gives licensed premises the authority to conduct their own compliance checks. RCW 66.44.290. If there is a rule for this, then there must be rule allowing the officers to do the same seems to be the reasoning.

The Liquor Act of 1933, in its entirety, is "an exercise of the police power of the state, for the protection of the welfare, health, peace, morals and safety of the people of the state, and all its provisions shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of that purpose." Laws of 1933, ex. sess., ch. 62, Section 2, RCW 66.08.010.

The dominion of the Liquor Control Board over the regulation, supervision and licensing of the retail sale of intoxicating liquors is, by legislative enactment, broad and extensive. Jow Sin Quan, et al, Appellants, v. Washington State Liquor Control Board, 69 Wn.2d 373 (1966), citing State ex rel. Shannon v. Sponburgh, 66 Wn.2d 135, 401 P.2d 635 (1965).

The Legislature has authorized the Liquor Control Board to employ liquor enforcement officers. RCW 66.44.010(4).

The police power found as the basis for the Liquor Act itself and the further definition of that power as "broad and extensive" by case law, warrants a conclusion that liquor control officers engaging in controlled buys, without a rule specifically stating they can do so, is within the power and objectives of the Board and its employees.

2. *Can the Liquor Control officers use minors in these controlled buys?*

This is a separate question than the first, although it is recognized that for enforcement of the age limit on the selling of liquor, the use of minors is inherent in the whole concept of a controlled buy. Nevertheless, the use of minors presents a separate issue.

Law enforcement has used decoys and informers for many years to present the opportunity for commission of a crime. State v. Gray, 69 Wn.2d 432, 418 P.2d 725 (1966).

These agents of law enforcement, at the direction of officers, and law enforcement officers themselves, have sometimes engaged in crimes to detect crimes. When this is part of a scheme of detection by law enforcement, such practices have not ordinarily been held illegal. State v. Emerson, 10 Wn. App. 235, 517 P.2d 245 (1973), citing United States v. Wray, 8 F.2d 429 (N.D. Ga 1925); and other cases.

An exception to this allowance of illegal activities occurs when the action of the law enforcement officer or his/her agent violates "fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice" mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Emerson, supra.

In Emerson, a police agent had sex on several occasions with alleged prostitutes, at law enforcement direction and using public funds, in order to demonstrate his sex partners were indeed prostitutes. The court noted that the agent committed acts which, if performed by one not engaged in crime detection duties, would have been in violation of the law. Nevertheless, this agent's conduct was not found to be shocking to the "universal sense of justice".

The acts committed by the agent in Emerson are far less "shocking" than a minor buying beer.

Minors used as "decoys" in the controlled buys by licensees are specifically exempted from prosecution due to their ages, as part of a larger scheme allowing the programs in these specific cases. RCW 66.44.290(2).

Although there is no exemption for the use of minors in controlled buys by law enforcement, there is also no rule, and none is required as noted above, allowing such controlled buys at all.

Minors are apparently not allowed to purchase and consume alcohol because public policy and human experience teaches us that minors do not have the judgment to use alcohol wisely and could cause themselves and others harm were they allowed to consume alcohol. (The fact that adults also often cause themselves and others harm when they have consumed alcohol is best left for another case.)

Public policy is that licensed premises abide by the law. Public policy is also that minors need to be protected and prevented from using alcohol. Where there are competing public policies, they need to be reconciled without unnecessarily impairing the vigor of each. Emerson, supra.

Minors used by the Liquor Control Officers are not allowed to consume the alcohol they purchase. The public policy protecting minors from consuming alcohol is thus satisfied and does not unnecessarily compete with the public policy that licensees abide by the law that they not serve minors.

The controlled buys engaged in by liquor enforcement officers are part of a scheme of detection by law enforcement, and are not unlawful, especially considering how difficult enforcing the age limit on sales of alcohol could be without using minors.

The issue of potential prosecution of these minors for breaking the law at the behest of liquor control officers is not addressed in the law, as is nothing else about such a "sting". There is therefore nothing to legally bar such prosecution. However, as a practical matter the officers will not and have not done so. Not only would this be completely unfair to the minors, the officers would have difficulty finding minors to help them should they do this.

Further, minors put in such a situation would have the complete defense of entrapment.

The use of minors by liquor enforcement officers is not unlawful.

3. *Was it lawful to send the minor into the licensed premises a second time?*

The minor in this case was sent back into the premises after being refused service the first time. Although there is the appearance the officers were going to keep sending him in until he was eventually served, there is some confusion regarding what was said to the minor after he was refused service. The undersigned believes the officer understood that the minor had been told by the bartender to "get a wristband" proving his age and so the officer sent the minor back into the premises to do just that.

The undersigned also believes the bartender meant the minor to understand he was to leave the bar unless he could prove his age to a doorman.

Regardless, there is no rule against sending the minor in a second time. It is true that at this point, he may well have been committing the crime of trespass, but realistically, he was doing so the minute he went into the bar the first time, given his age. This second pass does not convert the controlled buy, already ruled a lawful activity, into an unlawful activity.

4. *Do the controlled buys entrap licensees?*

Liquor Control Board action, directed toward the suspension or cancellation of a retail liquor license is not a criminal proceeding. Essentially, it is an administrative regulatory proceeding-civil and disciplinary in nature-the purpose of which is protect the public health, safety and morals from imprudent, improper, and/or unlawful actions of the board's licensees. Jow Sin Quan, supra, citing State v. Meyers, 85 Idaho 129, 376 P.2d 710 (1962); Kearns v. Aragon, 65 .M. 119, 333 P2d 607 (1958).

Entrapment is a defense only in a criminal proceeding. RCW 9A.16.070.

The controlled buy at issue did not entrap the permit holder.

DECISION SUMMARY
Permit Holder's Motion to Suppress And Motion to Dismiss

1. The Permit Holder's Motion to Suppress is **Denied**.
2. The Permit Holder's Motion to Dismiss is **Denied**.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 23, 2010, the Washington State Liquor Control Board (Board) issued an Amended Administrative Violation Notice to Joshua A. Hood, 9000 Mt. Hood Avenue, Vancouver, Washington, 98664. In its notice, the Board alleged that on December 17, 2010, the permit holder had violated the provisions of Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 66.44.270(1) by furnishing alcohol to a person under twenty-one (21) years of age. The permit holder made a timely request for hearing.

On February 16, 2011, the Board issued a Complaint in which it alleged that on or about December 17, 2010, Mr. Hood sold, gave or otherwise supplied liquor to a person under twenty-one (21) years of age in violation of RCW 66.44.270.

The hearing was held before Katherine A. Lewis, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), on July 28, 2011, in Vancouver, Washington. At hearing, the Board was represented by Brian Considine, Assistant Attorney General. The permit holder, Joshua Hood appeared and was represented by Tresa G. Cavanaugh, Attorney at Law. Almir Karic, Paul Magerl and [REDACTED] appeared as witnesses for the Board. Bruce Richardson, Misty Winders, Tracy Wild, Franklin Day, Deni Liufau, Brian O'Neill and Tara Bartell appeared as witnesses for the Licensee.

The Licensee was also cited in this matter. The hearing regarding that citation was held jointly with the present hearing for judicial economy reasons: all the witnesses were the same for both matters. The Licensee was represented by Curt Wyrick, Attorney at Law. There is a separate

Order regarding the Licensee, Docket No. 2011-LCB-0007.

Based on the record presented, the ALJ makes the following Findings of Fact:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The permit holder, Joshua A. Hood, is an employee of the Licensee, Charlie's Bar & Grill, Inc., dba Charlie's Bar and Grill (Charlie's), which is a restaurant and lounge located at 3315 NE 112th Street, Vancouver, Washington. Mr. Hood is a bartender and holds Permit No. 120 441 099.
2. Prior to the incident at issue, Mr. Hood had never received any citation for violation of the statutes or rules of the Board.
3. The Licensee used a "bracelet" or "wristband" policy. Doormen (bouncers) were placed at each door and were responsible for checking the identifications of entering patrons who looked younger than 30 years of age. If the patron was of legal age, he or she was issued a wristband which he/she was to wear. Bartenders were to check for these wristbands and anyone without a band was not to be served alcohol. Further, such a person was supposed to be told to either get a wristband or leave the premises.
4. Friday, December 17, 2010, was a busy, noisy night at Charlie's. There was a live band and over 100 patrons.
5. Liquor control officers Almir Karic and Paul Magerl did a compliance check at Charlie's on this night.
6. [REDACTED] was the minor investigative aide used for the check.
7. Pictures of [REDACTED] were taken prior to the check (Exhibit 5) and he was searched by the officers to make certain he had nothing on his person other than his driver's license and money provided by the officers for any alcohol purchase.
8. [REDACTED] was 19 years old on December 17, 2010 and his "vertical" driver's license

showed this. (Exhibit 5).

9. [REDACTED] was instructed by the officers that he was to enter Charlie's ahead of them, but that he was not to try and purchase alcohol until he saw one or both of the officers enter the establishment.

10. [REDACTED] approached the north door, the main entrance to Charlie's, shortly before midnight. According to [REDACTED] he stood at or near the door for one to two minutes and was ignored by the bouncer who was talking to someone.

11. The bouncer assigned to that door, Deni Liufau, denied anyone could have loitered near the door for a minute or two without him being aware and asking for identification. He also denied he was talking to anyone, but was busy checking the identifications of entering patrons. He did not recall seeing [REDACTED] but did not deny it was possible he could have "slipped by" and entered the bar.

12. Once he was inside, [REDACTED] waited for Officers Karic and Magerl to enter. When he saw them, he went to the bar and was approached by a bartender from whom he requested a bottle of Coors Light, a beer. The bartender, Misty Winders, asked to see the required wrist band. [REDACTED] told her he did not have one.

13. [REDACTED] states Ms. Winders simply told him "to go get one".

14. Ms. Winders contends she told him that he could not be in the bar without a wristband and he was to go to one of the bouncers and get one or get out.

15. This testimony was supported by fellow bartender Tracy Wild, who said she heard Ms. Winders tell [REDACTED] that he had to get a wristband or leave.

16. Liquor enforcement officer Paul Magerl stated he was close behind [REDACTED] when he ordered the beer and heard Ms. Winders tell [REDACTED] something like, "no wristband, no liquor".

17. According to [REDACTED] he then went in search of a bouncer in an attempt to obtain a

bracelet. He went to the south door of Charlie's and no bouncer was in sight. He then left the establishment through that door.

18. Franklin Day, the south door bouncer, was required on this night to let no one in through the south door. Consequently, he had no wristbands to give.

19. He asserted he was at his posted spot and was not aware of [REDACTED]. However, since his concern was people trying to come in not people leaving, Mr. Day could not be certain if [REDACTED] left through the south door. In any case, there is no evidence there was any communication between the two.

20. Officer Magerl followed [REDACTED] out the south door. (He also states there was no bouncer at that door.) The two discussed the wristband requirement.

21. Officer Magerl told [REDACTED] to go back to the north door and "try again".

22. Officer Magerl contended that if the claimant had flatly been denied the service of alcohol, he would not have sent him back in. However, he argued [REDACTED] had not been denied alcohol, but had been told to "get a wristband". This may be a distinction without a difference.

23. In any case, [REDACTED] again went to the north door and says he again stood "just inside the doorway" for a minute or two and was not asked for any identification from the bouncer, Mr. Liufau. He thereupon walked into the bar area and up to the bar.

24. Mr. Liufau again denied anyone could have loitered where [REDACTED] says he was without being asked for identification.

25. When he arrived at the bar, Mr. Hood asked what he wanted to which [REDACTED] responded "a Coors Light". Without asking to see a wristband, Mr. Hood brought the beer to [REDACTED] took payment for it, and made change.

26. Mr. Hood argued he is very consistent in checking for wristbands and/or identification and has

no memory of [REDACTED] nor of serving him alcohol on the night in question.

27. Upon receiving the beer, [REDACTED] took it to a table whereupon Officers Magerl and Karic came to the table, took the beer and excused [REDACTED] from the establishment.

28. The officers then located management personnel and informed them of the illegal service and of the fact that the establishment and Mr. Hood would be cited.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Office of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter pursuant to RCW 66.44, RCW 34.12, RCW 34.05, and WAC 10-08, WAC 314-11, WAC 314-16 and WAC 314.29.

2. As a permit holder, Mr Hood is subject to the jurisdiction of the Washington State Liquor Control Board. He is subject to the conditions and restrictions imposed by title 66 RCW and 314-11, 314-17 and 314-29 WAC. Proceedings involving agency action are adjudicative proceedings under RCW 34.05. The Board has the authority to assign such proceedings to an administrative law judge pursuant to RCW 34.12. A proper hearing was provided in this case.

3. RCW 66.44.270 prohibits the sale of liquor to any person under the age of twenty-one years. The definition of liquor includes beer. RCW 44.04.010(20).

4. Chapter 314-11 WAC sets forth general requirements and Chapter 314-17 outlines the responsibilities of a permit holder.

5. The Board, through its Liquor Enforcement Officers, conduct compliance checks to ensure individuals and establishments are complying with liquor regulations. These compliance checks involve sending a minor into a restricted premises, such as a bar, and having the minor attempt to buy or buy alcohol.

6. These minors are paid for their work and receive training from the officers. They engage in

the compliance checks under the supervision of the officers. As ruled above, these compliance checks and the use of minors is not unlawful.

7. Pursuant to RCW 66.24.010, the Board has the authority to suspend or cancel the permit holder's permit. Effective May 5, 2003, the Board has adopted as rules a set of "standard penalties" which may apply to certain offenses. WAC 314-29-015.


8. Because the violation by Mr. Hood is his first, the normal penalty is a \$200.00 fine or a five-day suspension of his permit. WAC 314-17-105.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Board's Complaint dated February 16, 2011, alleging a violation of RCW 66.44.270 on December 17, 2010 is **AFFIRMED**. The permit holder, Joshua Hood, Permit No. 120 441 099, shall either pay a penalty of \$200.00 or agree to a five-day suspension of his permit on a date to be set by the Board in its final order.

DATED and mailed at Vancouver, Washington, this 23 day of Sept, 2011.

WASHINGTON STATE
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS


Katherine A. Lewis
Administrative Law Judge
5300 MacArthur Blvd, Suite 100
Vancouver, WA 98661
Telephone: (360) 690-7189 or 1-800-243-3451
FAX: (360)

Mailed to:

Licensee:
Charlie's Bar and Grill, Inc.

dba Charlie's Bar and Grill
3315 NE 112th Avenue
Vancouver, WA 98682

Licensee Representative:

Curt Wyrick, Attorney At Law
12602 NW 46th Avenue
Vancouver, WA 98685

Assistant Attorney General:

Brian Considine, AAG
Office of the Attorney General
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100

Department Contact:

Kevin McCarroll
Adjudicative Proceedings Coordinator
Washington State Liquor Control Board
PO Box 43076
Olympia, WA 98504

Petition for Review of Initial Order: Either the licensee or permit holder or the assistant attorney general may file a petition for review of the initial order with the liquor control board within twenty (20) days of the date of service of the initial order. RCW 34.05.464, WAC 10-08-211 and WAC 314-42-095.

The petition for review must:

(i) Specify the portions of the initial order to which exception is taken;

(ii) Refer to the evidence of record which is relied upon to support the petition; and

(iii) Be filed with the liquor control board within twenty (20) days of the date of service of the initial order.

A copy of the petition for review must be mailed to all the other parties and their representatives at the time the petition is filed. **Within (10) days after service of the petition for review, any of the other parties may file a response to that petition with the liquor control board.** WAC 314-42-095 (2) (a) and (b). Copies of the reply must be mailed to all other parties and their representatives at the time the reply is filed.

Address for filing a petition for review with the board:

Washington State Liquor Control Board, Attention: Kevin Mc Carroll, 3000 Pacific Avenue, PO Box 43076, Olympia, Washington 98504-3076



Washington State
Liquor Control Board

December 22, 2011

Tresa G. Cavanaugh
Attorney for MAST Permit Holder
1409 Franklin Street, Ste 101
Vancouver, WA 98660-2860

Joshua A. Hood, MAST Permit Holder
9000 Mt Hood Ave
Vancouver, WA 98664-2735

Brian Considine, AAG
GCE Division, Office of Attorney General
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100

RE: FINAL ORDER OF THE BOARD
PERMIT HOLDER: Joshua A. Hood
PERMIT NO. 120441099
ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLATION NOTICE NO: 1J0351D
LCB HEARING NO. 23,810
OAH NO. 2011-LCB-0011

Dear Parties:

Please find the enclosed Declaration of Service by Mail and a copy of the Final Order of the Board in the above-referenced matter.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (360) 664-1602.

Sincerely,


Kevin McCarroll
Adjudicative Proceedings Coordinator

Enclosures (2)

cc: Tacoma and Vancouver Enforcement and Education Divisions, WSLCB
Teresa Young, WSLCB

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3 **WASHINGTON STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD**

4 IN THE MATTER OF:

5 JOSHUA A. HOOD
6 9000 MT HOOD AVE
7 VANCOUVER, WA 98664-2735

8 LICENSEE

9 MAST PERMIT NO. 120 441 099
10 AVN NO. 1J0351D

LCB NO. 23,810
OAH NO. 2011-LCB-0011

DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL


11 I certify that I caused a copy of the FINAL ORDER OF THE BOARD in the above-referenced
12 matter to be served on all parties or their counsel of record by US Mail Postage Prepaid via
13 Consolidated Mail Service for Licensees, by Campus Mail for the Office of Attorney General, on the
14 date below to:

15 TRESA G. CAVANAUGH
16 ATTORNEY FOR MAST PERMIT HOLDER
17 1409 FRANKLIN STREET, STE 101
18 VANCOUVER, WA 98660-2860

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
MAIL STOP 40100, GCE DIVISION
BRIAN CONSIDINE, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
GENERAL

19 JOSHUA A. HOOD, MAST PERMIT HOLDER
20 9000 MT HOOD AVE
21 VANCOUVER, WA 98664-2735

22 DATED this 22nd day of December, 2011, at Olympia, Washington.

23 
24 Kevin McCannoll, Adjudicative Proceedings Coordinator
25
26

DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY
MAIL

1

Washington State Liquor Control Board
3000 Pacific Avenue SE
PO Box 43076
Olympia, WA 98504-3076
(360) 664-1602